We analyze a two-receiver binary-input discrete memoryless broadcast channel, in which the transmitter communicates a common message simultaneously to both receivers and a covert message to only one of them. The unintended recipient of the covert message is treated as an adversary who attempts to detect the covert transmission. This model captures the problem of embedding covert messages in an innocent codebook and generalizes previous covert communication models in which innocent behavior corresponds to the absence of communication between legitimate users. We identify the exact asymptotic behavior of the number of covert bits that can be transmitted when the rate of the innocent codebook is close to the capacity of the channel to the adversary. Our results also identify the dependence of the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and the characteristics of the innocent codebook.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N CERTAIN scenarios, the very intention to communicate can be considered as a violation by itself resulting in dire consequences. Consequently, many techniques such as spreadspectrum communications have been developed to ensure communication with Low Probability of Detection (LPD) also known as covert communication. There has been a renewed interest to study the information theoretic limits of LPD, especially after Bash et al. [2] showed that covert communication over a point-to-point channel is subject to the square-root law, i.e., the transmitter can only send O √ n bits over n channel uses without being detected by an adversary. Several subsequent works have led to a complete characterization of the information-theoretic limits of covert communication over point-to-point classical channels, including a tight firstorder asymptotic characterization of the covert throughput over point-to-point channels [3] , [4] and second-order asymptotics for different covertness metrics [5] . Results of [4] , [6] have also identified the conditions required to achieve keyless LPD communication over Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) and Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs), respectively. A few works have investigated covert communication over multi-user Manuscript received August 28, 2018; revised January 5, 2019 and March 7, 2019; accepted March 8, 2019 . Date of publication March 25, 2019; date of current version June 14, 2019. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Award 1527387. This paper was presented in part at the 2017 IEEE Information Theory Workshop [1] . The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Eduard A. Jorswieck. (Corresponding author: Keerthi Suria Kumar Arumugam.) The authors are with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA (e-mail: keerthi.arumugam@gatech.edu).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2907190 channels; for instance, [7] characterized the covert capacity region of a K -user multiple-access channel (MAC), and [8] showed that a time-division strategy achieves the optimal covert throughputs for a class of broadcast channels. A few other works have analyzed scenarios in which the squareroot law does not apply; for instance, scenarios in which the adversary is uncertain about the channel parameters [9] , [10] or timing of the transmission [11] , [12] . In addition, there have also been efforts to construct explicit codes for covert communication [13] - [16] . All the above works define covert communication with respect to (w.r.t.) an innocent behavior in which the transmitter does not communicate. In contrast, we analyze a scenario in which the innocent behavior corresponds to the transmission of codewords from an innocent codebook that is permitted and decoded by the adversary. Since the definition of stealth communication is deceptively similar to that of covert communication, it is important to note the difference between them. Covert communication, which is governed by the square-root law, is an extreme regime in which the adversary possesses the exact same knowledge as any other receiver except the secret key, if any. Hence, the adversary also knows the channel to expect when there is no input. However, in stealth communication, the adversary expects one channel when the true channel is another, and the stealth transmitter takes advantage of this to transmit with a positive rate. The work of Dutta et al. [17] on covert communication using dirty constellations is one of the motivations for the present work. In [17] , the authors rely on channel noise to hide a covert signal by superimposing it on top of an innocent signal while incurring minimal distortion; consequently, the informed receiver can decode the covert message while the uninformed adversary attributes the distortion of the signal to channel impairments and hardware imperfections. Although the authors show that their message-hiding scheme is immune to certain statistical tests, their scheme is not fundamentally covert against a more powerful adversary. Our objective is to develop an information-theoretic analysis of embedding covert signals in innocent communication signals while escaping detection from an adversary who is not restricted to using a small set of statistical tests.
We model the setup of [17] as a two-user discrete memoryless broadcast channel in which a common message is sent to both users while a covert message is sent to only one user, treating the other as an adversary. This can be viewed as an instance of steganography [18] , in which the covertext is controlled in part through the design of a coding scheme and in part through the channel noise that is only statistically 1556-6013 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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known. The model that is closest to the one considered here is that of [19] , which analyzes the same broadcast setup for BSCs and exploits the additive nature of the noise in BSCs. Our results generalize [19] using different proof techniques.
Another related but different model is that of [8] in which the transmitter simultaneously sends two different covert messages to two legitimate users while escaping detection from a third user. The authors have shown that time-division transmission is then optimal in certain cases. Although there exist technical and conceptual connections between our model and that of [8] , our model captures a different problem and the results cannot be directly compared. We build upon the channel resolvability techniques developed in [4] , [7] for point-to-point channels and MACs, respectively, to embed covert information into innocent transmissions. As expected, we show that the transmitter can perturb no more than O √ n symbols of the n-length sequences representing the innocent transmission to be covert from the adversary. We precisely characterize the asymptotic behavior of the number of covert bits that can be transmitted when the rate of the innocent transmission approaches the capacity of the channel to the adversary. Our results highlight the dependence of the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and the characteristics of the innocent codebook. We provide an achievability proof, a detailed converse proof, and specialize our results to a BSC, all of which were omitted in the preliminary version [1] of this work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set the notation used in the paper and in Section III, we formally introduce our channel model. In Section IV, we develop a preliminary result that captures the essence of our approach to embedding covert information in innocent transmissions. We present our main result in Section V, which consists in an achievability and a converse characterizing the optimal asymptotic number of reliable and covert bits when the rate of the common message is close to the capacity of the channel to the adversary, and we conclude our work in Section VI with a brief discussion of extending our result to non-binary input alphabets.
II. NOTATION
We denote random variables and their realizations in upper and lower case, respectively. All sequences in boldface are n-length sequences, where n ∈ N * , unless specified otherwise. A sequence of random variables
The element at position ∈ 1, n of a sequence x j is denoted by x j, . We interpret log and exp to the base e; the results can be interpreted in bits by converting log to the base 2. Adhering to standard informationtheoretic notation, H(X) and I(X; Y ) represent the average entropy of X and the average mutual information between X and Y , respectively. If the distribution of X is P and the channel between X and Y is W Y |X , then I P, W Y |X also represents the average mutual information between X and Y . For x ∈ [0, 1], H b (x) denotes the average binary entropy of x. For two distributions P and Q on the same finite alphabet X , the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence is 
. KL divergence and variational distance are related by Pinsker's inequality [20] as V(P, Q) 2 1 2 D(PQ). If P is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q, we write P Q.
III. CHANNEL MODEL
We analyze a channel model in which Alice, the transmitter, communicates a common message to both Bob, the receiver, and Willie, the warden, and a covert message to Bob alone over a discrete memoryless broadcast channel X , W Y Z|X , Y, Z . We assume that the transmitter uses a binary input alphabet X {0, 1} and that the output alphabets Y and Z are finite. Furthermore, we assume that all terminals are synchronized and possess complete knowledge of the coding scheme used.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , Alice wishes to communicate a uniformly distributed common message W 2 ∈ 1, M 2 to both Bob and Willie, and a uniformly distributed covert message W 1 ∈ 1, M 1 to Bob alone in n channel uses. Alice may also choose not to transmit any covert message, in which case, she sets W 1 = 0. Note that there is no prior on whether W 1 = 0 or W 1 = 0. Alice then encodes the message pair (W 1 , W 2 ) = (i, j ) into an n-length codeword X i j . We label the collection of codewords X 0 j M 2 j =1 as the innocent codebook. Alice sends the codeword over the discrete memoryless broadcast channel in n channel uses, at the end of which, Bob and Willie observe the n-length sequences Y and Z, respectively. Since the channel is memoryless, we denote the transition probability corresponding to n uses of the channel by W ⊗n
For a ∈ X , we denote the output distributions induced by each input symbol at Bob and Willie by P a (y) W Y |X (y|a) and Q a (z) W Z |X (z|a), respectively. For a, b ∈ X with a = b, we assume P a P b , Q a Q b , Q a = Q b . Without the first assumption, Bob has an unfair advantage over Willie [4] . Without the second and third assumptions, achieving covert communication is either impossible or trivial [3] , [4] . We also make the following assumptions.
• The channel X , W Z |X , Z to Willie admits a unique capacity-achieving input distribution , for which (1) λ * , where λ * > 0. Many channels encountered in practice satisfy this assumption. 1
, so that Willie limits the rate of the common message. Upon observing the noisy sequence Z, Willie forms an estimate W 2 of W 2 . We measure reliability at Willie using the following metric,
where
Willie attempts to detect the presence of a non-zero covert message by performing a binary-hypothesis test on his observation Z to distinguish between hypotheses H 0 {W 1 = 0} and H 1 {W 1 = 0}. We denote Willie's Type I and Type II error probabilities by α and β, respectively. For a fixed W 2 = j , the output distribution observed by Willie is
For a fixed common message W 2 = j , we measure the covertness of W 1 by the KL divergence D Q n j Q n j . Note that any statistical test [21] conducted on Z by Willie must satisfy
Using Pinsker's inequality [20] , we
Consequently, a vanishing KL divergence ensures that α + β = 1 in the limit so that Willie's statistical test is no better than a random guess. Upon observing Y, Bob forms an estimate ( W 1 , W 2 ) of the transmitted message pair (W 1 , W 2 ). We measure reliability at Bob using the metric
Definition 1: A code for the above model is an
Note that P (1) e and P (2) e are not usual average error probabilities because our model does not impose a prior on whether Alice embeds a covert message or not. Nevertheless, one can check from the definition that a small values of P (1) e and P (2) e guarantee that the average error probability of Bob and Willie is small. Also note that we choose to satisfy the stringent requirement that lim n→∞ D Q n j Q n j vanishes for every j ∈ 1, M 2 so that the hypothesis test used by Willie is futile in detecting the presence of any covert message for every choice of the common message and not just on average. Definition 2: A throughput/rate pair (r 1 , r 2 ) is achievable if there exists a sequence of (M 1 , M 2 , n, n , δ n ) codes 2 with increasing blocklength n such that for all j ∈ 1, M 2 ,
and
The optimal covert throughput is the supremum of all covert throughputs r 1 that can be achieved when the common message is transmitted at a rate close to the capacity of the channel to Willie.
A couple of comments are now in order. First, note that our goal is twofold here: we wish to design a reliable code to communicate a common message and a reliable code to embed a covert message; this is a joint code-design problem, and we do not address the problem of embedding covert bits into a fixed code for the common message. Second, the problem generalizes previous works on covert communication, in which covertness was measured w.r.t. the innocent distribution Q ⊗n 0 corresponding to the transmission of the all-zero sequence. In our case, for W 2 = j ∈ 1, M 2 , covertness is measured w.r.t. the distribution Q n j , which is a product distribution that is not identically distributed and corresponds to the communication of the innocent codeword mapped to the common message W 2 = j .
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Following the approach put forward in [4] , we define a covert stochastic process, which serves as the target distribution that our covert code approximates. By introducing the covert process, we precisely quantify the fraction of symbols in the innocent codeword that Alice can perturb to transmit covert information while simultaneously avoiding detection by Willie. For a fixed n ∈ N * and a sequence x ∈ X n , we define the covert process as the output of the binary asymmetric channel V X |X illustrated in Figure 2 such that V X |X (1|0) α n and V X |X (0|1) β n , where α n , β n ∈ (0, 1) are cross-over probabilities. We denote the input distribution of the covert process by x,α n ,β n defined as
We set γ n β n α n , and when defining a sequence {γ n } n∈N * , we ask that it converges to γ ∈ R + . As a result, we induce the output distributions
at Bob and Willie, respectively. Note that both P ⊗n x,α n ,β n and Q ⊗n
x,α n ,β n are product distributions, and setting both crossover probabilities, α n and β n , to 0 results in a distribution Q ⊗n
x,0,0 at Willie. We now have the following generalization of [4, Lemma 1] .
Then, for a large n ∈ N * , we bound D Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n Q ⊗n
x,0,0 by (15) . The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix A. For any x, upon choosing sequences {α n } n∈N * and {β n } n∈N * such that lim n→∞ nα 2 n = lim n→∞ nβ 2 n = 0, we obtain
which implies Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n is indistinguishable from Q ⊗n x,0,0 at Willie. In addition, it is also possible to simultaneously choose {α n } n∈N * and {β n } n∈N * such that lim n→∞ nα n = lim n→∞ nβ n = ∞ to flip an infinite number of innocent symbols as n → ∞, while still ensuring that Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n is indistinguishable from Q ⊗n x,0,0 according to (15) , shown at the top of the next page. If we set x = x 0 j , where x 0 j is the innocent codeword corresponding to W 2 = j , the distribution Q ⊗n x 0 j ,0,0 is the innocent distribution corresponding to transmitting just the common message W 2 = j and is equivalent to the distribution Q n j in (3).
V. MAIN RESULT
We now characterize the exact scaling of the number of covert bits when the common message is transmitted at a rate approaching the capacity of the channel to Willie. Also, for the transmission of covert bits without a secret key, Bob is required to possess a certain advantage over Willie, which we precisely characterize in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the channel model described in Section III, if there exists a γ 0 such that
for the λ * defined in Section III, then the throughput/rate pair (r 1 , r 2 ) given by
where the maximum in (18) is over all γ that satisfy (17), is achievable. 3 Proof: We first show that Bob can decode the covert message, and both Bob and Willie can decode the common message reliably. Using channel resolvability techniques, we then show that the induced distribution Q n W 2 corresponding to the common message W 2 is indistinguishable from the covert stochastic process Q ⊗n x 0W 2 ,α n ,β n when averaged over all choices of the common message W 2 . Finally, we identify a coding scheme that achieves (18) and (19) such that (17) is satisfied. a) Random code generation: Let us define a set D n {x :
is the weight of x. For j ∈ 1, M 2 , we generate M 2 codewords x 0 j ∈ X n independently at random according to the distribution P n X defined by
Generating x 0 j M 2 j =1 according to P n X ensures that every x 0 j is -letter typical w.r.t. the distribution . We label this set of M 2 codewords as the innocent codebook C 2 . For every W 2 = j ∈ 1, M 2 , we generate M 1 codewords independently at random according to the distribution x 0 j ,α n ,β n and label this set of codewords as the covert sub-codebook C 1, j corresponding to the common message W 2 = j . Alice encodes the message pair (W 1 , W 2 ) = (i, j ), where i ∈ 1, M 1 and j ∈ 1, M 2 , to the codeword x i j ∈ C 1, j and transmits it through the discrete memoryless broadcast channel. Defining
we show that the decoding error probability of the common message at Bob and Willie averaged over all random codebooks C decays exponentially in the following lemma.
we have
for an appropriate constant ξ 1 > 0. 3 Note that the characterization of r 1 in (18) is valid for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and not just λ * , as long as there exists a γ 0 that satisfies
The proof of Lemma 2 follows the random coding argument outlined in [22, Sec. 7.3] and is omitted here. Note that
Consequently, we have
Since lim n→∞ α n = lim n→∞ β n = 0, the channels W Z |X and W Z |X are identical in the limit of large blocklength. Using a similar argument, we can show that the channels W Y |X and W Y |X are identical in the limit of large blocklength. Next, defining Q Z (z)
x (x)W Z |X (z|x) and expanding the mutual information term I , W Z |X using (27) and (28), we obtain (31), shown at the top of the next page. Similarly, we obtain
Using (31) and (32), we rewrite the condition in (23) as shown in (33), shown at the top of the next page. Recall our assumption that I , W Y |X I , W Z |X in Section III and the fact that lim n→∞ α n = lim n→∞ β n = 0. Consequently, we assume both Bob and Willie have decoded the common message successfully and set
for an arbitrary μ ∈ (0, 1). b) Channel reliability analysis: We now prove that the decoding error probability of the covert message at Bob decays exponentially. For i ∈ 1, M 1 , the following events lead to a decoding error at Bob,
• codeword x 0 j is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates W 1 = i , • codeword x i j is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates W 1 = 0, • codeword x i j is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates
The decoding error probability of the covert message at Bob averaged over all random codebooks satisfies the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For any μ ∈ (0, 1) , ∃ n 0 ∈ N * such that for all n n 0 , if
for an appropriate ξ 2 > 0. The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix B. c) Channel resolvability analysis: We now show that the KL divergence between the induced distribution Q n W 2 and the covert stochastic process Q ⊗n X 0W 2 ,α n ,β n averaged over all choices of the common message and all random codebooks vanishes in the limit of large blocklength.
Lemma 4: For any ν > 0, ∃ n 0 ∈ N * such that for all n n 0 , if
for an appropriate ξ 3 > 0. The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix C. d) Identification of a specific code: Using Markov's inequality, we obtain (39), shown at the top of the next page. Defining n exp (−ξ 4 nα n ) + exp (−ξ 4 nβ n ) for an appropriate constant ξ 4 > 0, we conclude from (39) that there exists at least one coding scheme C * such that for a large n,
where x 0W 2 ∈ C * 2 is the codeword corresponding to the common message W 2 . We expurgate half of the innocent codewords and their corresponding covert sub-codebooks such that for every remaining W 2 = j , we have
without affecting the asymptotic rate of the common message. Note that covertness is not affected by expurgating whole covert sub-codebooks. Since lim n→∞ n = 0, (44), (45), and (46) imply lim n→∞ P
Following steps similar to [7, (249)-(254)], we bound the absolute value of the last term in (48) for a large n and an appropriate ξ 6 > 0 by
Combining (47) to (49), we conclude that for a large n,
for an appropriate constant ξ 7 > 0. e) Asymptotic behavior: We now establish the asymptotic scaling of log M 1 for the proposed covert communication scheme. Combining (15) and (50), for a fixed W 2 = j , we bound D Q n j Q n j by (51) and (52), shown at the top of the next page. Combining (35), (51), and (52), we obtain (53), shown at the top of the next page. Ultimately, combining (37), (51), (52), and (53), we arrive at the condition in (17) .
Theorem 2: For the channel model described in Section III, consider a sequence of (M 1 , M 2 , n, n , δ n ) codes with increasing block length n such that lim n→∞ n = lim n→∞ δ n = 0. If the common message is transmitted using a codebook that achieves the capacity of the channel to Willie, then for every j ∈ 1, M 2 , there exists an infinite subset N ⊆ N * such that (54), shown at the top of the next page is true. For some γ * 0 that maximizes the right hand side of (54) and for a subsequence of codes with increasing blocklength n ∈ N that achieves a covert throughput equal to the right hand side of (54), we have (55), shown at the top of the next page.
Proof: Consider a capacity-achieving codebook C * for the channel between Alice and Willie. For a fixed common message W 2 = j , consider a sequence of covert communication schemes characterized by n, j P W 1 = W 1 |W 2 = j , δ n, j D Q n j Q n j , and log M 1 takes the maximum value such that lim n→∞ log M 1 = ∞. Note that lim n→∞ n, j = lim n→∞ δ n, j = 0 since lim n→∞ n = lim n→∞ δ n = 0. We denote the innocent codeword corresponding to W 2 = j by x 0 j = x 0 j,1 , x 0 j,2 , . . . , x 0 j,n ∈ C * , the innocent symbol at position by x 0 j, , and the information symbol at position by x c 0 j, 1− x 0 j, . For a fixed W 2 = j , Alice transmits an nlength codeword X i j = X i j,1 , X i j,2 , . . . , X i j,n , i ∈ 1, M 1 , and we denote the distribution of the codeword by n j and the distribution of the symbol at position by j, , where j, (x)
We define j, (x c 0 j, ) = 1 − j, (x 0 j, ) = μ (n) j, . We interpret μ (n) j, as the probability of flipping innocent symbol x 0 j, to information symbol x c 0 j, at symbol position ∈ 1, n . Note that the innocent symbol x 0 j, depends on the choice of the common message W 2 = j and the symbol position . For W 2 = j and every n ∈ N * , we define a permutation π (n) j of 1, n to define a new code such that μ (n)
The performance of the new code that satisfies (57) is identical to that of the original code since the channel is memoryless.
Hence, without loss of generality, we only study the sequence of codes that satisfies (57) for every n ∈ N * . For conciseness, we define the following terms.
depending on the choices of j and . Defining K (z) K j, (z) , we remove the dependency of K (z) on j and . We define the distribution of each symbol Z of Z by
Let us now analyze the KL divergence between Q n j and Q n j .
Since lim n→∞ δ n, j = 0 and since KL divergence is nonnegative, we obtain lim n→∞ D Q j,1 Q 0
However, K (z) is not exactly zero for all z ∈ Z, since Q 1 = Q 0 . Hence, we obtain lim n→∞ μ (n) j,1 = 0. Consequently, from (57), we conclude that lim n→∞ μ (n) j, = 0 for all ∈ 1, n . Next, define
Since lim n→∞ μ (n) j, = 0, we have lim n→∞
Combining (74) and the fact that ξ (n) j (z) is non-negative by definition, we conclude that lim n→∞ ξ (n) j (z) = 0, ∀z ∈ Z. Continuing the analysis of δ n, j from (66), we have, for n large enough,
where (a) follows from the fact that log
where n j,0 and n j,1 denote the number of 0's and 1's in x 0 j , respectively; ρ (n) j,0 and ρ (n) j,1 are the average probabilities of flipping 0 to 1 and 1 to 0, respectively. Note that lim n→∞ ρ (n) j,0 = lim n→∞ ρ (n) j,1 = 0. In addition, we set lim n→∞ γ (n) j = γ † j ∈ R + . If lim n→∞ γ (n) j = 0 or ∞, only symbols in positions either with innocent symbol 0 or 1, respectively, are used to embed covert information. Else, the sequence {γ (n) j } is bounded, and we can extract a convergent subsequence {γ (n) j } n∈N , where N ⊆ N * is an infinite set, with limit γ † j . Henceforth, we only consider the subsequence of codes with blocklength n ∈ N . Note that 1 − λ (n) j = n j,0 n . Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
(83) From (78), we continue to bound δ n, j by (87) as shown at the top of the next page, where (a) follows from (82) and (83). We pause the analysis of δ n , j here and define constant composition sub-codebooks [23] F k ⊂ C * with type P k in which k denotes the weight of any codeword of that type. As there are (n + 1) different types for sequences {0, 1} n , there are at most (n + 1) such sub-codebooks. Let us recall that the codebook C * is a capacity-achieving codebook for the channel between Alice and Willie; that is, the rate of the common message R log M 2 n = I , W Z |X − δ(n) with lim n→∞ δ(n) = 0. Let us assume that ∀k ∈ 1, n , log|F k | n R − δ for any δ > 0. For a δ < δ and n large enough,
We note that the assumption log|F k | n R − δ for all k ∈ 1, n results in a contradiction in (91) since M 2 = exp (n R). Hence, there exists at least one sub-codebook F k * such that
and P k * (1) = 1 − P k * (0) = k * n ∈ (0, 1). Using [23, Corollary 6.4], we bound the rate of this sub-codebook for an arbitrary υ > 0 by
Combining (92) and (93), we obtain
Using the unicity of the capacity-achieving input distribution, the concavity of mutual information and (94), we conclude that the type P k * is arbitrarily close to since δ and υ are arbitrary. Consequently, we replace λ (n) j with λ † λ * − for an arbitrarily small ∈ R.
We then bound log M 1 using standard converse steps.
n, j + n, j log M 1 (97) = I(X; Y|W 2 = j ) + I(W 1 ; Y|W 2 = j, X)
where (a) follows from the fact that I(W 1 ; Y|W 2 = j, X) = 0, and (b) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the memoryless property of the channel W Y |X . Rearranging the terms in (101), we obtain
Defining P j, as the distribution of symbol Y of Y, we upper bound the mutual information term in (102) by
Combining (102) and (105), we obtain 
where (a) follows from the fact that X is a function of (W 1 , W 2 ), (b) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (c) follows from (60) and the fact that KL divergence is non-negative. Continuing the analysis of log M 1 by expanding the mutual information term, we obtain
where (a) follows from (66). For an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and for a subsequence of codes that achieves 4 the right hand side of (110), we have (122), as shown at the top of the next page. For that sequence of codes, using (108), we obtain (124), as shown at the top of the next page. Since lim sup n→∞ a n lim inf n→∞ a n for any sequence {a n }, we obtain (125). as shown at the top of the next page. Combining (121) 
the definition of λ † and ν ↓ 0 in (125), we obtain lim sup
Note that the bounds (110) and (126) still depend on the choice of the common message W 2 = j through γ † j . To eliminate this dependency, we choose an optimal γ * 0 that maximizes the right hand side of (110) provided the following condition is satisfied.
Consequently, replacing γ † j with γ * in (110) and (126), we obtain (54) and (55).
For the subsequence of codes with blocklength n ∈ N , where N ⊆ N * is an infinite set, that achieves the right hand side of (54), we have lim sup
for some γ * that achieves the maximum in (54). According to Theorem 2, for that subsequence of codes, lim supn→∞ n∈N log M 1 nD Q n j Q n j is lower bounded as in (55). The combination of (55) and (128) imposes
which characterizes the advantage that Bob should possess over Willie to facilitate keyless embedding of covert bits.
Although we normalize log M 1 by nD Q n j Q n j , which depends on the choice of the common message W 2 = j , the bounds on log M 1 are independent of j . Also, for any sequence {a n } n∈N * and any infinite set N ⊆ N * , we have lim inf n→∞ a n lim infn→∞ n∈N a n and lim sup n→∞ a n lim supn→∞ n∈N a n . Combining this fact with Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we conclude that the optimal covert embedding throughput when the common message is transmitted at a rate close to the capacity of the channel to Willie, is given by
where γ * 0 is the largest number that satisfies (129).
Remark 1: As a special case, let us assume that the channel to Willie is degraded w.r.t. the channel to Bob. This assumption guarantees that (129) is satisfied as degradedness implies D(P 1 P 0 ) > D(Q 1 Q 0 ) and D(P 0 P 1 ) > D(Q 0 Q 1 ). Hence, in this case, covert information can be embedded on top of innocent transmissions. However, note that the degraded broadcast channel assumption is not a necessary condition to facilitate keyless covert communication in our case. As an example, let us consider a discrete memoryless channel X , W Z |X , Z with D(P 1 P 0 ) < D(Q 1 Q 0 ) and D(P 0 P 1 ) > D(Q 0 Q 1 ). Here, the channel W Z |X is not degraded w.r.t. the channel W Y |X . Since all KL divergence terms and λ * in (129) are determined by the channel, the only degree of freedom is γ . By choosing a γ that satisfies (129), covert information can be transmitted by embedding it on top of innocent transmissions without using a secret key despite the channel to Willie not being degraded w.r.t. the channel to Bob.
Remark 2: For symmetric channels with two inputs, note that D(P 1 P 0 ) = D(P 0 P 1 ),
since γ * = 1 and λ * = 1 2 . For the subsequence of codes that achieves the right hand side of (131), we obtain from (55),
Note that the covert throughput in (131) matches that of the point-to-point channel [4] . As a special case, we consider a broadcast setup for BSCs with p B and p W as the crossover probabilities for the channels from Alice to Bob and Willie, respectively. Assuming p B 0.5 and p W 0.5 without loss of generality, we obtain
Then, keyless covert communication is achievable in this channel model iff
x is a strictly decreasing function for x ∈ [0, 1 2 ], the condition in (136) translates to the requirement that the channels to Bob and the warden satisfy p B p W . Hence, to embed covert information over a binary symmetric broadcast channel without using a secret key, the crossover probability of the channel to Bob cannot be greater than the crossover probability of the channel to Willie.
Remark 3: As another special case, consider a broadcast setup for binary asymmetric channels W Y |X and W Z |X . For a, b ∈ {0, 1} such that a = b, we define the crossover probabilities by W Y |X (b|a) p a B and W Z |X (b|a) p a W . The extreme case when one of the two input symbols is always transmitted without any noise is of particular interest. Assuming p 0 B = p 0 W = 0, we specialize the two binary asymmetric channels to Z-channels. Consequently, we have
(139)
Note that in a Z-channel, the covert transmitter cannot flip the noiseless symbol to embed covert information and is restricted just the one other symbol to embed covert information. Hence, γ , which denotes the ratio of the flipping probabilities used to embed covert information, has to be unbounded as well to counteract the unbounded terms above. Redefining γ as γ 1 γ 2 , and choosing, for instance, γ 1 = c, where c > 0 is a constant and γ 2 = p 0 B , we have the following achievable covert embedding throughput.
is fixed by the channel to the warden. Also, the condition in (129) that is required to facilitate keyless covert embedding translates to p 1 W p 1 B , which simply implies that the crossover probability from symbol 1 to 0 should be higher in the channel to the warden.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude by briefly discussing an extension of our results to non-binary input alphabets. Consider an input alphabet X {u} K −1 u=0 , where K > 2. Note that there is no notion of a fixed innocent symbol. We confirm that our results extend to non-binary input alphabets, and the steps required to arrive at our results are similar to those for the binary case discussed in this work. We denote the unique capacity-achieving input distribution for the channel to Willie by , where (u) λ u * such that K −1 u=0 λ * u = 1. We define two vectors γ {γ u } u∈ 0,K −1 ∈ R K + and β {β uv } (u,v)∈ 0,K −1 2 ∈ [0, 1] K 2 such that β uu = 0, and K −1 v=0 β uv = 1 for all u ∈ 0, K − 1 . Then, following our proof techniques, one can show that we can achieve, for an arbitrary μ ∈ (0, 1),
where the max in (141) is over all γ and β that satisfy
We do not provide the steps explicitly in this work because of space constraints.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n is an n-fold distribution, we write Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n = n i=1 Q x i ,α n ,β n . We now analyze the KL divergence between Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n and Q ⊗n x,0,0 . D Q ⊗n x,α n ,β n Q ⊗n
For k ∈ N * and two distributions P and Q defined on the same alphabet Z, we define χ k (PQ) z ( P(z)−Q(z)) k Q k−1 (z) and η k (PQ) z:P(z)−Q(z)<0
( P(z)−Q(z)) k Q k−1 (z) . Then, using [4, Lemma 1], we upper bound each of the two KL divergence terms in (144) by (145) and (146) shown at the top of the next page. For n large enough, using [4, Lemma 1], we lower bound the two KL divergence terms in (144) by (147) and (148) shown at the top of the next page. Loosening the bounds in (145)-(148), for n large enough, we obtain (149) and (150) shown at the top of the next page. Ultimately, combining (144), (149), and (150), we obtain (15) .
(1 − α n ) P 0 (y) log P 0 (y) P 0,α n ,β n (y) + y α n P 1 (y) log P 1 (y) P 0,α n ,β n (y) 1 x 0 j,i = 0 + y β n P 0 (y) log P 0 (y) P 1,α n ,β n (y) + y (1 − β n ) P 1 (y) log P 1 (y) P 1,α n ,β n (y)
Define γ j (1 − δ) n i=1 I X i ; Y i |X i = x 0 j,i for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1). Expanding I X i ; Y i |X i = x 0 j,i , we obtain (168) as shown in the top of this page, where (a) follows from combining (145), (146), (147), and (148), in the proof of Lemma 1. Defining λ j n i=1 1{x 0 j,i =1} n and aggregating the n mutual information terms corresponding to where (a) follows from Jensen's inequality. Defining μ (n) min min {(1 − α n ) min z Q 0 (z), (1 − β n ) min z Q 1 (z)}, we bound the log term in (175) by (179) shown at the top of the previous page, where (a) follows from the fact that x kj W ⊗n Z |X z|x kj
x 0 j ,α n ,β n x kj = Q ⊗n x 0 j ,α n ,β n (z). Combining (175) and (179), we obtain (180) shown at the top of the previous page.
Defining λ j n i=1 1{x 0 j,i =1} n and using steps similar to those used to obtain (169) in Appendix B, we obtain (181) shown at the top of the previous page.
Defining τ j (1 + δ) n i=1 I X i ; Z i |X i = x 0 j,i for an arbitrary δ > 0, we bound the probability term on the right hand side of (180) using Bernstein's inequality [7, Appendix D] by
for an appropriate ζ 2 > 0. Consequently, combining (180) and (182) and ensuring 5 log M 1 satisfies (37) for an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1) and a large n, we conclude that there exists a constant ξ 3 > 0 such that (38) is satisfied.
